I. Roman and Sixteenth-Century Foundations for Law Beyond the State
Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Vattel each drew heavily on the Greco-Roman classical tradition, in which ideas about empire and about the applicability of law beyond the territorial state and its citizenry had become a significant issue not later than the fifth century BC once the city-state of Athens had assembled an empire. We regard this tradition as essential to understanding the thought of these writers with regard to law connected to matters beyond the state, and will seek in this section to identify some ways in which this is so.
One of the most significant early philosophical assessments of the moral implications of imperialism was that put forward in the mid-first century BC by the Roman orator and statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero. 1 Cicero's Republic has as its object the ideal constitution and government which Cicero identified with the constitution and government of the early and middle Roman
Republic. This was the period that had seen the development of Rome from being one among many cities constituting the Latin League to being the dominant power in the Mediterranean and beyond, exerting both direct rule over six provinces and controlling adjacent territories indirectly through diplomatic activity. 1 Another is the Melian dialogue in Thucydides 5, 84ff.
After discussing constitutional theory merely in terms of prudential criteria such as stability, effective rule and longevity, Cicero in book three of the dialogue moves towards a moral consideration of the Roman commonwealth, framing it as an exchange of arguments modeled on a pair of famous speeches given by the Academic skeptic Carneades in Rome in 155 BC, speeches in which Carneades had argued, first for the importance of justice for a polity, and then, in the second speech, against its importance. Two things are particularly significant about Cicero's reframing of Carneades's speeches. First, Cicero turned the sequence of the speeches on its head, thus beginning with the skeptical challenge to justice and assigning the defense of justice the last word; and second, when adapting what he knew about Carneades's arguments for his own dialogue, Cicero applied the controversial discussion of the importance of justice for politics to the international realm, thus extending political theory beyond the polis and rendering
Rome's acquisition of an empire a subject fit for normative, moral consideration. It is thus fair to say that book three of Cicero's Republic has been among the most important of the early Western philosophical treatments of imperial justice, bringing moral philosophy to bear on Rome's rule, beyond the borders of a given polity. To justify the applicability of any particular norms to trans-border issues, it could not possibly be sufficient merely to say that they were the norms of a favored city-state. These norms would have to be justified by criteria of utility and self-interest (as Philus, the alias for Carneades, is made to argue in the Republic), or by criteria of justice, largely framed in Stoic natural law 3 and Roman just war terms (as Laelius, delivering the pro-justice speech in the Republic, maintains). Natural law provides the yardstick for gauging the justice of imperial rule and conquest, and its provisions as presented by Cicero are of a moral kind derived from Stoic ethics, not, as Carneades would have it, merely prescriptions for self-preservation appealing to our self-interest. The Roman legal provisions concerning the waging of a just war embody (in Laelius's and Cicero's view) rules of natural law.
In the sixteenth century controversy over the justice of the Spanish conquests and the overseas empire, the Carneadean debate loomed large. Both proponents and adversaries of the Spanish conquest and rule used the Roman empire and its forcible expansion as a prime analogy, with Augustine's ambiguous account of the justice of the Roman empire in City of God serving as the main text for both sides. 4 Critics of Roman and Spanish imperial rule, notably the Dominican theologian Domingo de Soto, argued that the Romans' right to the territories they conquered was "in force of arms alone," the Romans having "subjugated many unwilling nations through no other title than that they were more powerful. these norms that should govern the natural state to be found? And were they legal or rather moral in character? Richard Tuck has argued strongly that Grotius's natural law is based ultimately on the universal human urge for self-preservation and consists only in "an extremely narrow set of rights and duties." 21 We understand Grotius's approach to norms in the state of nature as broader both in their content and in their basis. Like Gentili before him, Grotius thought that norms of private Roman law were applicable to subjects beyond the polity, both to private individuals and to sovereign polities. Like Gentili, he thought that certain Roman law norms were declaratory of natural law; but for these norms to be valid for sovereigns as well this was not sufficient-an analogy between polities and private individuals had first to be established. Well aware of the importance of this move, Grotius explicitly addressed the extension of private Roman law to the relations between polities and, after applying a discussion of servitudes by the Roman jurist
Ulpian to the high seas, justified it thus: "It is true that Ulpian was referring […] to private law; but the same principle is equally applicable to the present discussion concerning the territories and laws of peoples, since peoples in relation to the whole of mankind occupy the position of private individuals."
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This allowed Grotius to attribute natural rights and duties not only to sovereigns in the East Indies who were trading partners of his own country, the expansionist Dutch Republic, but also to private entities such as the Dutch East India Company, and thus made for a rich account of the state of nature. 23 Grotius applied to places that had remained in a natural state, such as the high seas, and to the relations between and across sovereign polities, a doctrine of natural rights modeled on certain remedies from Roman law. Rights to self-defense, and certain property rights and contractual rights (all capable of being vested in individuals, sovereign states, and other entities), were embedded in Grotius's natural law and applicable beyond any given polity.
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These subjective rights, best described as claim-rights in the Hohfeldian sense, were derived from a natural law system based on Aristotle's commutative, as opposed to distributive, justice. Both the natural law and the subjective natural rights flowing from it were held to be of a dual nature, moral as well as legal. Grotius's criteria for validity of law in JBP thus blend source criteria with content criteria in a way apt to address jurisprudential problems concerning the nature of international law that remain fundamental in modern times, when a perceived lack of settled formal criteria for sources has led some scholars to assume that international law, not amounting to a legal system, is but a set of separate rules. 28 The sources are natural law, divine volitional law, and human volitional law-the human volitional law encompasses sub-municipal orders (such as paterfamilias over wife/children, and master over slave), municipal laws (jus civile, and incidental agreement among municipal laws, which is not jus gentium), and jus gentium (true law, and that which produces merely external effects). 29 Another source criterion lies in the requirement that a rule, in order to be of the jus gentium, must conform with the understandings and practices of all nations or all of the better nations. such that other-regarding, moral reasons become a requirement for acting in one's "self-interest."
Hobbes, on the other hand, engaged in a re-definition of "moral," so that self-interested action becomes a requirement of Hobbes's changed meaning of "moral." As in classical ethics, selfinterest and morality in Hobbes thus do not seem to be in conflict-yet once Hobbes's exercise in renaming is understood, it becomes clear that Hobbes's state of nature is indeed conventionally "Hobbesian" in that prudential self-interest rather than an independent sense of obligation to moral or legal norms drives behavior in the state of nature. 41 There is no clash in Hobbes between personal aims and impartial morality, because Hobbes's re-defined morality, starting from the single normative principle of rational self-interest, is not based on impartiality.
Noel Malcolm has made a stimulating case that Hobbes's state of nature is, with regard to international relations, much more substantively regulated than we have suggested above and than most interpreters of Hobbes have thought, with the dictates of natural law being applicable 40 Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 111. The laws of nature are not only obligatory as the commands of God, it is rather that obligations to the authority of God are derived from the laws of nature, to which the basic obligations are owed: Nagel, "Hobbes's Concept," pp. 75-78. 41 In classical ethics, the relation between morality and self-interest is characterized by the identification of the utile with the honestum and iustum, and a certain re-definition of the utile takes place; not, however, without the attempt to show how that re-definition at a deeper level is in accord with the conventional understanding of expediency. But Pufendorf can also be read as having framed a distinctive approach: in the following paragraphs we will address one such reading put forward by Istvan Hont. 48 Pufendorf distinguished between government established by (or at least understood by) Hobbesian contract (Hobbes's political union), and the non-contractual constitution of commercial society (the concord or consensus that Hobbes sought decisively to reject, but that Pufendorf was able to reframe not in a republican-political way but through a more modest conception of society).
Pufendorf agreed with Hobbes that the reasons for instituting government are best understood by positing the idea of a contract, that law is the command of a superior, and that law depends for its validity not on its content but on the authority of whoever promulgates it, a view much different Although Pufendorf accepted that society was secondary in importance to the [Hobbesian] political state, nonetheless he saw it as important enough to be theorized in its own right." 49 As
Hont has pointed out, Pufendorf did not think collective sociability was natural quite in the same way as the drive to individual self-preservation is, but driven by the human need to cooperate stemming from incapacity and ever-growing wants. He contrasted the natural state of humans marked by imbecillitas (weakness) and indigentia (neediness), with the state of life produced by human industry, cultura. Society is formed as the means to overcome neediness. Commerce, and the cultura that is intertwined with commerce, thus corresponds with the formation and flourishing of society. This commercial society was not necessarily preceded by, and did not lead inexorably to, the contractual formation of the civitas (the state). In Hont's crisp assessment of Pufendorf's view: "Hobbes was wrong in thinking that social diversity and the difficulty of 49 Hont, Jealousy, p. 45.
survival required the creation of the civitas." 50 Pufendorf illustrated the possibilities by reference to the society existing among neighboring families in an agricultural community, and by the cross-border relations of international trade. The creation of a civitas depended on constitution of a state by a specific act of will --the adoption of a contract by which the participants surrender their natural liberty. Hont suggests that for Pufendorf this contract was the means to achieve not only security, but also the "Prospect of living in a better Fashion and greater Plenty," especially in the burgeoning cities.
51
Rulers should in ordinary times adhere both to the positive law of the state and to the natural law of relations beyond the polity -interest, sociality, reason, and commerce would normally require adherence to these. But the existence of legal norms did not mean that rulers of states must always be tightly constrained by them, nor that the juridical would necessarily dominate the political. As Horst Dreitzel observes, Pufendorf, while avoiding the language of reason of state, "did not shirk from advocating the disarmament of citizens, the disempowerment of 'potentes', forbidding the formation of parties, and proscribing any innovation, using trade policy to disadvantage other states and cancelling treaties according to changes in the political situation." 52 The question of when a breach of the applicable positive law was the right policy for the salus populi was one requiring the highest expertise in statecraft and in policy -it was not a question for ordinary judges, but nor was it a matter for capricious will or irresponsible decision. 
IV. Conclusion
At the same time as the modern idea of the state was taking shape, Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf formulated three distinctive foundational approaches to international order and law beyond the state. They differed in their views of obligation in the state of nature (where ex hypothesi there was no state), in the extent to which they regarded these sovereign states as analogous to individuals in the state of nature, and in the effects they attributed to commerce as a driver of sociability and of norm-structured interactions not dependent on an overarching state.
We have argued in this paper that, while they each build on shared Roman and 16 th century foundations, the differences between the views held by (and subsequently taken of) Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf on these core issues were of enduring importance with regard to the sources, nature and content of law and morality on matters reaching beyond a single polity. In 
